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Several authors, politicians, leaders of international organisations and journalists have cautioned 
the world community that the increasing scarcity of freshwater resources might lead to national 
and international conflicts. When relating this to climate change forecasts – most of which indi-
cate that climate change will have a significant impact on the availability of freshwater resources, 
on water quality, and on the demand for water – this is alarming news for humankind as it threat-
ens human security [1]. Not only can one expect a significant impact of climate change on the 
availability and quality of freshwater resources, one can also expect an increase in conflicts 
which are water related. Fortunately, there are also voices which question the empirical evi-
dence for this ‘conflict scenario’, pointing to the opportunities for, and experiences with, co-
operative arrangements for sharing river resources [2,3, 4]. This article gives an outline of this 
debate and touches upon some relevant issues involved. The article is primarily based on se-
condary information from previous studies.  
 
A comparison of freshwater withdrawal per country and per sector (domestic use, industrial 
use, agricultural use) shows a large variation between various countries. For example, in 1994 
the withdrawal for domestic use in Malawi was 9 m3 per person per year, whereas for Iceland 
this was 176 m3 per person per year [5]. Such variation is not only present between countries: 
the inequality within countries is enormous as well. Water consumption in Israel and in the 
settlements is much higher than that of their Arab neighbours in occupied territories who are 
restricted from pumping water. It seems that – in some cases – controlling groups are able to 
capture resources at the cost of politically marginalised groups due to asymmetrical power 
relations. 
Acreman [6] and Pearce [7] show that there is overexploitation of water in several regions, 
and have calculated water exploitation indexes as a percentage of renewable annual water 
resources. These are: 83 % for Tunisia; 92% for Egypt; 140% for Israel; 169% for Gaza; 644% 
for Libya (because 84% comes from non-renewable fossil water from beneath the Sahara); 
50% for Syria; 25% for Lebanon; 20% for Algeria and 40% for Morocco (referred to in [8]). 
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Figures on water supply and sanitation reflect the harsh reality of life for many people, 
most of whom are living in developing countries. More than one billion people do not to have 
access to clean drinking water, and approximately 2.4 billion people do not have access to 
adequate sanitation. Gleick [9] indicates that an estimated 80% of the diseases in developing 
countries are water related. Every day 14 to 30 thousand people, mainly children and elderly, 
die because of waterborne diseases [10], or due to floods and droughts.  
Problems related to the supply of freshwater resources, and more in particular to safe 
drinking water, can not be addressed properly without recognising the interrelation between 
multiple functions and uses of water. Water resources are used for human consumption, for 
sanitation, washing, bathing and cultural or religious rituals, and for economic purposes, such 
as agriculture, livestock, industry, tourism, and transportation [11]. Water resources are also 
considered to be an integral part of the ecosystem, for wetlands, coastal areas, mangroves, and 
more in general for humid, arid and semi-arid areas. Over-extraction of water for industrial use 
may severely affect ground water levels, affecting not only the ecosystem, but also agriculture 
in the area and potentially the access to safe drinking water [12].  
At UNCED in 1992, the international community emphasised this interrelation stating that 
‘the extent to which water resources development contributes to economic productivity and 
social well-being is not usually appreciated, although all social and economic activities rely 
heavily on the supply and quality of freshwater.’ (Agenda 21, Chapter 18; Protection of the 
Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources). Due to this interdependence, any change of sub-
national, national or regional water regimes and property rights has inevitably an impact on the 
availability of water for different uses and competition over water among different user groups 
[13]. This complexity clearly requires a coherent approach which not only addresses the exis-
ting inequalities in access to water, but also foresees actual or potential competition over water 
between different user groups. But first and foremost, it requires an understanding of the 
factors which could contribute to water scarcity.  
Therefore, for analytical purposes, first, a typology of resource scarcity and scarcity related 
conflicts is provided based on earlier work by Ohlsson [14] and Homer-Dixon and Blitt 
[15,16]. The next sections explore how climate change and privatisation may result in water 
scarcity using this typology. The final section focuses on the question whether water scarcity is 
indeed a source for conflict, or whether there are reasons to believe that such conflict is 
avoided by co-operation and joint management in potential conflictuous areas. 
Different types of scarcity and conflicts  
In order to explain why and under which conditions countries co-operate, it is useful to look at 
the theories and studies which have been conducted about conflicts and their relation to 
scarcity of natural resources. First of all, one can make a distinction between different types of 
conflicts. Ohlsson [14] makes a distinction between first-order conflicts, which are those 
resulting from natural resource scarcity itself; and second-order conflicts, which result from the 
adaptation strategies by which societies try to overcome natural resource scarcity, such as 
conflicts which emerge when large numbers of people are displaced by dam-building projects.  
Ohlsson further indicates that water scarcity can be demand-driven, supply-driven or that 
it can be the result of structural inequalities between different groups of water users. Demand-
induced scarcity results from the water needs of increasing populations with justified demands 
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for increased welfare; supply-induced scarcity results from rivers running dry, lowered water-
tables, and polluted groundwater and surface water courses; and structural scarcity emerges 
‘when more powerful segments of water users confiscate a larger part of the scarce resource, 
resulting in the ecological and economic marginalisation of the less powerful’ [17]. Homer-
Dixon and Blitt indicate that these three types of environmental scarcity often interact in two 
patterns, to which they refer to as ‘resource capture’ and ‘ecological marginalisation’: 
 
Resource capture occurs when demand- and supply-induced scarcities interact to 
produce structural scarcity: powerful groups within society, anticipating future shor-
tages due to increased population growth and a decrease in the quantity and quality of 
the resource, shift resource distribution in their favour, which subjects the remaining 
population to scarcity. Ecological marginalization occurs when demand-induced and 
structural scarcities interact to produce supply-induced scarcity: lack of access to 
resources caused by unequal distribution forces growing populations to migrate from 
regions where resources are scarce to regions that are ecologically fragile and ex-
tremely vulnerable to degradation [10, cited in 18] 
 
Homer-Dixon distinguishes between five types of violent conflict related to environmen-
tal scarcity: (i) disputes arising directly from local environmental degradation, (ii) ethnic clashes 
arising from migration and social cleavages due to environmental scarcity, (iii) civil strife 
caused by environmental scarcity, (iv) scarcity-induced interstate war, (v) North-South conflicts 
over mitigation of, adaptation to, and compensation for global environmental problems. In his 
study, Homer-Dixon shows that the fourth type – interstate scarcity wars over, for example, 
water – is the least probable [19]. Nonetheless, water scarcity may be used strategically as a 
component of war strategies, as has been the case with food aid and food production in the 
past. 
Both Ohlsson and Homer-Dixon focus on environmental scarcity as potential cause of 
conflict. Various studies of armed conflict (e.g. Knauft [20]) show that armed conflict is 
seldom mono-causal. However, the distinction between different types of environmental 
scarcity and conflict enables us to look at different measures and policies. Some measures 
enhance the potential for conflict while other measures reduce it. Examples of the former 
category are measures which aim at improving supply-side management by large-scale engi-
neering efforts or which aim to maximise the economic return of water (allocation efficiency). 
If, for example, a government authority decides to redirect water to cities and industries and 
thus away from agriculture, this will directly affect peoples’ livelihoods and food-security and 
can therefore be a source for future (domestic) conflict [14]. Paul Richards emphasises that the 
problem may not be ‘scarcity’ of resources as such, but the perceived injustice (scarcity of 
justice) in the allocation of resources [21]. This will be the case if asymmetry of power is reflec-
ted in the allocation of, and access to, resources [22]. 
Naturally, measures which could be characterised as resource capture by powerful groups 
within society are more likely to result in conflict than measures which do the opposite by 
trying to reduce demand-induced, supply induced and structural scarcity through a coherent 
and integrated approach.  
In the following two sections, we will look at two significant changes or trends which are 
believed to affect the availability, quality and demand for, and access to, fresh water resources: 
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climate change and the global trend towards privatisation. While climate change is likely to 
result in supply induced scarcity, privatisation in the water sector and commoditisation of water 
resources is likely to result in structural scarcity. Following the argument by Ridgeway and 
Jacques [18], the discussion on the contribution of population growth to environmental stress 
and violence is left aside in this article since this tends to disguise questions related to unequal 
distribution of, access to, and control over, natural resources within society.  
Climate change, water, and human security 
Various studies and models suggest that climate change will have a significant impact on the 
availability of freshwater resources, on water quality, and on the demand for water. Climate 
and regional hydrologic models suggest changes in the variability of storms, in the frequency, 
intensity, and area of tropical disturbances, and in the frequency of droughts and flooding in 
particular areas. The availability of water resources is not only influenced by climatic condi-
tions, but also by other environmental changes, such as rapid deforestation. Deforestation is 
known to result in erosion, lower water retaining capacities of the soil (soil-moisture deficit) 
and diminished soil fertility. The characteristics of the impacts of climate change are explained 
in more detail by Tao et al [23]: 
 
The water cycle is an integrated and dynamic component of the earth’s geophysical 
system and both affects and is affected by climate conditions. Changes in the earth’s 
radiation balance affect winds, temperatures, atmospheric energy and water transport, 
cloud dynamics and more. Changes in temperature affect evaporation and transpira-
tion rates, cloud characteristics and extent, soil-moisture, and snowfall and snowmelt 
regimes. Changes in precipitation affect the timing and magnitude of floods and 
droughts, and shift runoff regimes. Synergistic effects will alter cloud formation, soil 
and water conditions, vegetation patterns and growth rates. 
 
Ragab and Prudhomme provide estimates of changes in temperature and rainfall per 
region. They indicate that, over the past century, there has already been a decrease in rainfall 
throughout the Mediterranean region, southern Africa and the Sahel, Australia and the Aral Sea 
Basin [24]. They furthermore state that by 2050 rainfall is expected ‘to be reduced in North 
Africa, parts of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Israel by 20-25% less than the 
present mean values and a temperature rise between 2 and 2.75 ºC’. The estimates for the Thar 
Desert (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan) are a decrease of mean annual rainfall of 5-25% and an 
increase of mean annual temperature by 1.75-2.5 ºC [8]. 
Several country case studies show in more detail the potential impacts of climate change 
on water availability and human security. For example, Tao et al analysed the possible impact 
of climate change on the dryland crop production in North China (including Northwest and 
Northeast China and the north China plain), where an estimated 24% of Chinese total food 
production is produced. They conclude that, ‘although the expected increases in precipitation 
may alleviate water stress on crop in Northwest China, the expected increases in water 
demands and soil-moisture deficit, and decreases in precipitation would challenge the rain-fed 
crops in the north China plain and Northeast China’.  
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Climate change has not only an impact on arid and semi-arid regions, but also on regions 
where flooding frequently occurs. Mirza shows [25] the potential impact of climate changes on 
the probability of the occurrence of floods in Bangladesh and its implications, in terms of 
characteristics of floods and crop damage, for the basin areas of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and 
the Meghna river:  
 
future changes in precipitation regime have four distinct implications. First, the [...] 
onset and withdrawal of monsoons may be delayed or advanced. Second, an increase in 
monsoon precipitation in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna basins may increase 
the magnitude, frequency, depth, extent and duration of floods. Third, timing of peak-
ing in the major rivers may also change […] Fourth, increased magnitude, depth and 
duration of floods will bring a dramatic change in land-use patterns in Bangladesh. 
 
These studies show that the data on climatic and hydrological conditions from the past are 
not reliable anymore to guide decisions on long-term water planning and construction of new 
water supply and irrigation systems for the future. If governments and water authorities want 
to address demand- and supply-induced scarcity, or respond to an increase of ‘magnitude, 
frequency, depth, extend and duration of floods’, it is a prerequisite to re-examine existing 
policies and instruments, using new information from climate change forecasts [26] and using 
information from forecasts on the upcoming trends in population growth and migration 
patterns (urbanisation, regional transboundary migration) [27]. 
The question is not only how climate change affects human security directly in terms of 
protection from floods, food security, or access to safe drinking water. The question is also 
how governments and powerful groups will respond to domestic water scarcity, to changing 
soil and water conditions, and to climate change as such. As indicated before, the impact of 
climate change will strongly vary among states due to a number of reasons, including their 
geographic location, widely different capacities [28] to mitigate the expected impacts of climate 
change, and due to asymmetrical power relations at the international level. Even within 
countries, different impacts can be expected for different groups. The impacts of climate 
change are likely to be much more severe for many developing countries, whereas these 
countries are less able display effective responses. In her book on the climate change 
convention, Gupta [29] observes that climate change is still a ‘pseudo-domestic agenda item’ in 
many developing countries: at the time, it is not perceived as a priority by domestic actors [30]. 
One of the reasons mentioned by Gupta is the ideological vacillation, which reflects confusion 
about the world-view which is most appropriate for their country. One of the competing 
frames is between the environmental ideology and the liberalisation ideology. According to 
Gupta ‘The environmental hype [with UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development)] has come at the same time as the liberalisation hype’ [with the World 
Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes]. The environmental ideology has been imported at 
a rhetorical level, and the liberalisation ideology is being implemented in policy’.  
Privatisation of water and human security 
The global commitment made in Johannesburg to reduce the proportion of people without 
access to safe drinking water by 50% by the year 2015 [31], seems to be contradictory to global 
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patterns of privatisation and liberalisation which are reported to affect the demand for, quality 
of, and access to, water [32]. Over the past decades, one could observe a rapid and global trend 
towards transfer of the production, distribution, and management of water or water services 
from public entities into private hands [9]. This transfer of responsibilities towards the private 
sector is partly caused by inappropriate management of water by government agencies. In 
recent years, several international aid organisations and the Bretton Wood Institutions (BWI) 
have pushed developing countries towards privatisation and public-private partnerships in the 
water sector. Water rights [33] and water markets have become common terms, and water is 
increasingly treated as a tradable commodity. The poor implementation of these privatisation 
policies and the lack of attention to vulnerable groups in society are subjected to severe 
criticisms. Gleick et al. [9] observe that: ‘Rapid implementation of private-public partnerships 
for water supply has, in too many cases, blatantly disregarded the needs of the poor’. 
The denial of the control by communities over their own natural resources, the sharp 
increase in water rates, the withdrawal of water for industrial purposes or large scale produc-
tion, and the distrust of the power of multinational corporations, have resulted in protests and 
marches, sometimes in social unrest and violence. In many cases where civil protests seem to 
revolve around water resources, other socio-economic problems play a role as well. Again, not 
only the scarcity as such, but in particular the perceived injustice in allocation of, or access to, 
water resources is likely to inflame sentiments among the affected population groups. 
One of the examples in which such changes led to social protest is the ‘water war’ in 
Bolivia. This ‘war’ erupted in 1998 when the Bolivian government entered into a contract with 
Aguas de Tunari, a consortium led by the Italian-owned International Water Limited and the 
US-based Bechtel Enterprise Holdings. The new company modified the rate structure, resulting 
in much higher rates for local residents (up to 200% of the original price). Aguas de Tunari 
claimed that the increases in prices would mainly affect industries, not the local population, but 
this was contradicted by local farmers and residents of the town. As stated by one of the 
managers of the company, their aim was to make profit, not to contribute to development. 
Thousands of people participated in a march to protest against the concession to the consor-
tium which, according to the local population, did not have attention for the concerns of the 
poor. It was one of the few cases where the demonstrations and fights resulted in defeat of the 
water company: in late April 2000, the Bolivian government cancelled its contract with Aguas 
de Tunari [34]. Unfortunately, as referred to by one of the women activists involved in this 
struggle, ‘afterwards, what had we gained? We were still hungry and poor’ [35].  
Regional conflicts related to water scarcity 
Several authors, politicians, leaders of international organisations, and journalists have cau-
tioned the world community to the fact that the increasing scarcity of freshwater resources 
might lead to national and international conflicts [36]. These predictions are not new: water 
scarcity is often related to future war. Three observations seem to support this assumption. 
First of all, more than 200 river systems are shared by two or more countries. Toset [37] 
indicates that ‘many rivers run between countries with a history of conflict, where water plays 
and important role in the economic life of the country’. Secondly, some countries depend for 
more than 80% on upstream countries for their renewable water resources, such as Syria, 
Sudan, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Mauritania, Kuwait and Bahrein [8]. Such dependency is expect-
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ed to create potential for conflict. Finally, overexploitation of water, as shown in section one, 
in combination with the impacts of climate change, may well lead governments to divert major 
rivers, construct large dams, or tap underground aquifers which extend beneath their neigh-
bours’ territory. Ragab and Prudhomme [8] view the potential draining of these aquifers as 
major potential for future conflict. Examples of such aquifers are the great fossil-water-filled 
aquifers beneath the Sahara desert; the Eastern Erg artesian aquifer, south of the Atlas Moun-
tains (Algeria, Tunisia); and the Nubian aquifer (Libya, Egypt and Sudan).  
One of the most visible areas where regional instability is partly related to the control over 
water resources is the Middle East. Ragab and Prudhomme explain how structural scarcity and 
resource capture of freshwater resources by the Israelis has played a role in the conflict 
between Israel and its neighbours, not only by diverting the River Jordan to the Sea of Galilee, 
but also by draining more than 300 Mm3/yr from the aquifer through boreholes on the Israeli 
territory near the coast. Obviously, although the occupation of territories offers Israel strategic 
control over water resources, it is not the main cause for political tension between the coun-
tries in the region. That the Israeli-Arab water conflict cannot be discussed separately from the 
overall conflict, is also indicated by Feitelson [38], who distinguishes two perspectives among 
political scientists and international relations experts: 
 
One strand suggests that while the two levels of conflicts are intertwined water issues 
can be decoupled and addressed separately, perhaps setting the stage for a resolution 
of the wider conflict. That is, as water is not necessarily the crux of the inter-state 
conflict, and as there are benefits to be reaped from co-operation over water issues 
they can be indeed a basis for co-operation before the inter-state conflict is resolved 
[…] The second line of argument suggests that the way water conflicts are conducted, 
and the options for resolving them, are a function of the power relations between the 
parties, the hydrological situation, the importance of the water resource under con-
tention for the different parties and the benefits of co-operation for each riparian. 
Miriam Lowi concluded on the basis of an extensive study of the Israeli–Arab water 
conflicts that in this case the second strand applies. 
 
One can distinguish between two different scenarios. The conflict scenario foresees serious 
water scarcities and an increasing potential of conflicts between numerous countries. In this 
scenario, access to water may be seen by nations as a matter of national security. The other 
scenario is the co-operation scenario: ‘while freely admitting the possibility of conflict, it denies its 
inevitability […] The co-operation scenario further points to the possibility of co-operative 
arrangements for sharing river resources between the upstream and downstream countries, 
including treaties and joint river administrations’ [37]. 
Kliot, Shmueli and Shamir [3] examined the nature, characteristics and shortcomings of 
co-operative arrangements for the management of 12 transboundary river basins [39]. They 
indicate that co-operative water resource management faces several obstacles, such as the criti-
cal nature of water for human existence; the multiple use of water; the sheer scale and the gap 
between policies and implementation of these policies. However, they conclude that: 
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many institutions which govern the management of transboundary water resources 
point to the fact that in many river basins countries are able to overcome their differ-
ences and co-operate to the benefit of all. 
 
Similar findings have been presented by Wolf [4] and Yoffe, Wolf and Giordano [40,41]. 
They conclude: ‘We found that international relations over freshwater resources are over-
whelmingly co-operative and cover a wide range of issue areas, including water quantity, quali-
ty, joint management and hydropower’ and ‘Most of the commonly cited indicators linking 
freshwater to conflict proved unsupported by data. Neither spatial proximity, government 
type, climate, basin water stress, dams or development, nor dependence on freshwater re-
sources in terms of agricultural or energy needs showed a significant association with conflict 
over freshwater resources’ [41]. Also Toset reaches a similar conclusion: although the results of 
their study indicate that ‘the low availability of water in both countries in the dyad is signifi-
cantly related to disputes’ they conclude that there is not sufficient evidence to claim that 
sharing a river provides a major source of armed conflict [37]. 
Conclusion 
The last section clearly showed that at the international level, water appears to pose a reason 
for transboundary co-operation rather than for war, often preventing escalation instead of 
causing it. Yoffe, Wolf and Giordano found that highly co-operative events often involved 
more than two countries. Furthermore, the analysis of multilateral treaties on fresh water 
resources shows that a large share of these treaties stressed several objectives: economic 
development, joint management and water quality, rather than only water quantity and hydro-
power [41]. This confirms the effectiveness of a coherent approach which foresees actual or 
potential competition over water between different user groups as was indicated in the intro-
duction of this article. This positive conclusion does not mean that there are no concerns left. 
The degrading situation under which many people have to live gives no reason to celebrate the 
stability of the status quo. Further co-operation to improve their position is required in order to 
have a larger group of people living in relative security. Such improvement might at the same 
time empower them to stand up against an existing elite. 
One of the main concerns is the unequal access to freshwater resources at the national 
level. Although privatisation measures in the water sector are not necessarily negative with 
respect to the water demands of the population, it can result in concerns and resistance among 
the population as could be seen in the case of privatisation in Bolivia, where the contract 
between the government and the company bypassed the local population, worsened economic 
inequities, and ignored the affordability of water. Therefore, these measures and reforms 
should be accompanied by measures to ‘permit equitable access to water for poor populations, 
include affected parties in decision-making, and improve water-use efficiency and productivity’  
[9]. Gleick also emphasises the need for openness, transparency and strong regulatory 
oversight. This dimension has hardly received attention in this article. In an administrative-
political context where the institutional framework is weak and regulations are easily circum-
vented, this dimension can be extremely important. 
Another concern can only be answered in the future. When the expected impacts of 
climate change increasingly become reality, will governments be able to address the challenges 
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at the national and international levels without resorting to resource capture? Will they be able 
to formulate a coherent framework with policies and instruments which reduces structural 
forms of water scarcity? 
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